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Abstract 
We derive the closed-form solution characterizing the equilibrium in a circular-city model with 
competing firms of heterogeneous production costs. Tractability issues in this setting are well 
known and have not been resolved in prior work. In this paper, the equilibrium solution 
illustrates effects of production costs on firms’ strategic decisions, their aggregate profit, and 
consumer surplus. 
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Production Cost Heterogeneity in a Circular-City Model 
1. Introduction 
Based on Salop’s influential work (1979), applications of Salop’s circular-city model have 
generated important insights in economics and a variety of other disciplines. However, efforts to 
relax assumptions of the model are challenged by analytical tractability. An important extension 
of Salop (1979) is to examine firm heterogeneity in the spatial context. Many recent studies have 
contributed to this direction of research (Syverson 2004, Vogel 2008, 2011, Alderighi and Piga 
2012). However, in Syverson (2004) and Vogel (2008, 2011), rivals’ heterogeneous costs do not 
play a role in a firm’s pricing decision. The dependency of equilibrium prices on rivals’ 
heterogeneity is meaningful because firms’ strategic responses to their neighbors’ heterogeneous 
characteristics create an effect that propagates throughout the market – an important 
phenomenon also observed in practice. Whereas the circular-city setup offers the power to 
capture such an effect, this very feature also substantially complicates the analysis.   
 This paper allows for dependency of firms’ decisions on rivals’ heterogeneous 
characteristics. The focus is on characterizing equilibrium pricing decisions of firms with 
heterogeneous production costs in a circular spatial setting. Related to our work, Alderighi and 
Piga (2012) also incorporate firms’ heterogeneous characteristics that impact their strategic 
decisions. Their results identify the uniqueness of equilibrium prices but do not generate the 
closed-form solution of such an equilibrium. Whereas numerical results (as shown in Alderighi 
and Piga 2012) illustrate some properties given sets of parameter values, availability of an 
analytical solution in our work offers the theoretical foundation for obtaining rigorous insights 
through comparative statics. Moreover, our derivation of the equilibrium solution is 
generalizable to settings with heterogeneity other than that of production costs in a circular-city 
model.  
 Based on the closed-form equilibrium solution, we identify a ripple effect that connects 
all firms pricing strategies. Not only does a firm’s cost exert a positive impact on its own and all 
other firms’ prices, such effect diminishes as it propagates away from the originating firm, 
similar to the dynamics of ripples during dispersion. Furthermore, we identify effects of 
production cost heterogeneity on firms’ equilibrium prices and profits and on consumer surplus. 
2. The Model 
Our model inherits the standard properties of Salop (1979) circle-city model. On a circle of unit 
circumference, a continuum of consumers is distributed uniformly, and   firms are located 
equidistantly. Consumers are indexed by their own locations, which represent taste. Without the 
loss of generality, let firm i be located at  
 
 
 and offer products of value   at price   . Firms set 
prices simultaneously. Each consumer purchases at most one unit of product. The distance 
between a consumer and her chosen firm represents the misfit between the purchased product 
and her ideal product. Let a consumer’s transportation cost be linear in the distance between 
locations of the firm and the consumer at rate  . Thus, a consumer located at x who purchases 
from Firm i derives the utility              
 
 
   .   
We extend the Salop (1979) model to account for heterogeneity in firms’ production costs. Firm i 
incurs a marginal production cost    where             . Following the convention in the 
literature (Eaton and Lipsey 1978, Syverson 2004, Alderighi and Piga 2012), we examine the 
equilibrium in which all firms obtain a positive market share. In other words, we impose the 
following condition to rule out cases where an existing firm cannot actively compete with other 
firms.  
Condition 1. For all                         
 
 
. 
We apply Condition 1 to the analysis throughout the paper. Notice that a firm's pricing strategy 
and profit are not only affected by its first-degree neighboring rivals—those located on its 
immediate left and right—but the firm’s price and profits are in fact functions of pricing 
strategies and production costs of all remaining firms. Intuitively, the first-degree neighboring 
rivals strategize with consideration for their neighbors, who are second-degree neighbors to the 
original firm. Competition propagates around the circle and links all firms’ pricing strategies 
together (Alderighi and Piga 2012). Each firm’s product cost rides on this ripple effect and plays 
a role in all the other firms’ pricing strategies. The demand for Firm i is then    
 
 
 
 
  
      
         , generating a profit of 
                     
 
 
 
 
  
                  (1) 
For notational convenience, we extend the domain of i, such that i∈Z, to allow for continuous 
increments to firms’ indices. Firms i and i±n denote the same entity. 
3. Analysis and Results 
Proposition 1: There exists a unique equilibrium among n firms. 
For Firm i,              ,    
  
 
 
        
   
    
where,      
      
 
       
   
         
 
   
   (2) 
Firm i's profit is   
  
 
 
   
     
 . 
Proof: All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
Proposition 1 summarizes an important contribution of this work – the closed-form solution of 
firms’ equilibrium in a circular-city model with cost heterogeneity. The functional form of 
equilibrium prices reaffirms aforementioned intuition that each firm's pricing strategy depends 
not only on its own production cost as well as those of all other firms in the market.  
Eq. (2) yields a number of interesting insights into how production costs affect firms’ 
equilibrium prices and profits. In Eq. (2),    
     
   
 represents the impact of the production cost 
of Firm i's  th-degree neighbor on Firm i's price.   
 First,        suggests that a firm’s price increases with its production cost, but by a 
lesser magnitude than the increase in the production cost. Competition plays a role in 
moderating the extent of price increase as a result of higher production cost.  As 
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
             ,  a firm's profit decreases as its production cost increases.   
 Second,     , for              which implies that an increase in any firm's 
production cost leads to a price increase for every firm in the market. This follows from 
the first property: As an increase in a firm’s production cost raises its own price, such 
price increase mitigates the firm’s price competition with its first-degree neighbors, who 
then also raise price. The ripple effect passes incentives to raise price from firm to firm 
around the circle, resulting in price increases for all firms. Furthermore, 
   
    
 
 
 
          
    
  ; thus, whereas an increase in a firm’s production cost reduces its 
own profit, the other firms’ profits increase.  
 Third, through ripple effect, the impact of a firm's production cost on other firms' prices 
weakens as it travels further away from the original firm. This is illustrated by Eq. (2): 
                          
       . In other words, a firm's price is affected 
more strongly by the production costs of the firms that offer more similar products than 
those offering products of greater differentiation.    
We now turn to the analysis of the equilibrium price, profit and consumer surplus according to a 
general distribution of cost heterogeneity subject to Condition 1. Let us consider an industry 
where firms' production costs are independent of each other, following an identical cumulative 
distribution function,     .     
Proposition 2: The average equilibrium price in the market is made up of the average production 
cost plus a constant markup:      
   
 
 
      . 
Intuitively, the average price decreases when more firms are in the market (a higher n) due to the 
competition effect; meanwhile, the average price increases with a higher degree of differentiation, 
which is implicit in any increase in consumers’ transportation cost t. More interestingly, this 
result implies that the magnitude of any increase/decrease in the production cost (of one or 
multiple firms) is fully accounted in equilibrium prices. Firms are able to completely transfer this 
shift in cost to consumers, and not only to those buying from the firms that incur such cost shift. 
Whereas a firm’s price changes to a lesser extend relative to the changes in its production cost 
(Proposition 1), the remaining difference in the production cost is accounted for in the total 
adjustments of the other firms’ prices, as a result of competition under ripple effect.   
Proposition 3: The price variance is increasing in the variance of production costs; furthermore, 
             . The expected aggregate profit of firms is increasing in the variance of 
production costs and independent of the expected production cost. 
Not surprisingly, production cost heterogeneity causes dispersion in equilibrium prices; however, 
the variance of production costs always dominates that of prices. An increase in the variance in 
production cost allows either high-cost firms (which are also firms with higher prices) to charge 
more or low-cost firms to charge less, because a firm’s equilibrium price is increasing in its own 
cost (Proposition 1). The variance of prices in turn increases. On the other hand, the ripple effect 
distributes the impact of the cost change on one firm to price changes among all firms 
(Proposition 1). This propagated price change tightens variation in price relative to that in cost.  
Furthermore, shifting the average production cost while holding the variance fixed has no impact 
on firms’ competition intensity and expected aggregate profit, which, instead, increases in the 
variance of costs. An increase in the variance of production cost leads to a higher degree of 
asymmetry in the competition. Given that        (Proposition 1), firms with increased costs 
suffer a loss in its margin as well as market share, whereas the opposite applies for those with 
reduced costs. Therefore, as the variance of costs increases, among the expected aggregate profit 
the proportion of transactions with increased margin overtakes those with reduced margins under 
competition with the ripple effect; as a result, the expected aggregate profit goes up.  
Proposition 4: The expected consumer surplus is decreasing in the average production cost and 
increasing in the variance of production costs. 
A higher variance of production costs not only raises the aggregate profit (Proposition 3), it also 
increases the expected consumer surplus. Clearly, the latter requires that the average production 
cost does not shift up. Because increases in costs are fully transferred to price (proposition 2), 
which offsets the positive effect of variance on consumer surplus. Suppose the average cost is 
fixed, a higher variance can be achieved by increasing a higher cost while decreasing a lower 
cost. Whereas the locations of the firms whose costs change generally matter, the expected 
consumer surplus accounts for uncertainties in firms’ locations. This mean-preserving spread in 
productions costs will lead to a wider expected price gap between any two neighboring firms. In 
expectation, the consumer segment that benefits from the widened price gap is larger than the 
segment that becomes worse off, because reductions in the lower cost lead to price cut which 
expands the firm’s market share.  
From both Propositions 3 and 4, the scenario of increasing cost variance while fixing the average 
cost results in a higher social welfare. It suggests a potential mechanism to increase profitability 
of an industry without taxing consumers. Whereas overall improvements in production efficiency 
may actually intensify firms’ competition, balanced shocks such as policies to regulate supplier 
contracts to induce dispersion of production efficiencies or capabilities may improve social 
welfare. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper makes an important theoretical contribution to the literature on spatial competition 
with heterogeneous firms by characterizing the closed-form equilibrium. The results illustrate the 
ripple effect among competing firms and explain the dependence of equilibrium prices on the 
distribution of production costs. Furthermore, the analysis on the aggregate profit and consumer 
surplus shed light on the impact of policies and mechanisms that may alter industry-wide 
production costs.  
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Appendix  
Proof of Proposition 1. 
Proof:  
From (1)  F.O.C. w.r.t.   :                 
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From (3)                                     
  
 
    , for all i; Thus, 
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Similarly,       
   
                        
   
             
          
  
 
       .   Summing up these equations for all i gives: 
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   . Applying this equation 
form for all i: 
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and then summing them up yields: 
           
 
      
  
       
       
    
    
 
        
         
 
         
   
   
            
Thus,    
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where    
      
 
       
   
         
 
   
  . Notice that    
      
 
  
         
 
   
   because: 
for     ,        
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   , or, 
      
 
  
         
 
   
  . 
From (3),    
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Substitute (5) into (1),     
     
      
 
 
 
 
  
     
      
        
 
 
   
     
   
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
Proof: Since   
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Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
Proof: 
As   
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   .  (   are independent of each other). 
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 Thus, 
      
   
    
       
   
Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
Without loss of generality, the expected consumer surplus on the circle is             
   
 
 
 
 .   
Consider the marginal consumer between firm 0 and firm 1,     
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  buys from Firm 0;       
 
 
buys from Firm 1.  
Thus,      
   
 
 
 
                
  
 
          
 
 
      
 
 
 
  
    
      
 
  
        
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
        
 
  
        
 
 
  
 
 
       
 
   
   
Define        . As             
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then,       
   
 
 
 
       
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
    
 
 
  
 
 
       
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
      
 
 
    , where 
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